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Abstract 
 
In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, the implication of financial liberalisation for 
stability and economic growth has come under increasing scrutiny. One strand of literature posits a 
positive relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth and development.  
However, others emphasise that the link between financial liberalisation is intrinsically associated   
with financial instability which may be harmful to economic growth and development. In this study, 
we offer an empirical analysis assessing the relationship between financial instability, financial 
liberalisation, financial development and economic growth based on a dataset of 41 African 
countries spanning the years 1985-2010. The results suggest that the link between financial 
development and liberalisation has a positive and significant effect on financial instability but the 
latter has a harmful effect on economic growth, which are more pronounced in the pre- financial 
liberalisation periods than in the post-liberalisation.  
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1. Introduction 
In Africa, by the late 1980s and early 1990s against an unfavourable background of rapidly 
deteriorating economic and financial conditions, many countries in Africa undertook far reaching 
economic reforms (see Aryeetey, 1994; Collier, 1993; Ekpenyony 1994; Kesekende and Atingi 
Ego, 1999; Khan and Reinhart, 1990). Within the framework of  the structural adjustment programs 
supported by IMF and World Bank, these countries restructured their economies in order to achieve 
private sector led growth, through a market based system (the World Bank, 1994). Financial 
liberalisation was a significant component of these reforms, this enabled the deregulation of the 
foreign sector capital account, the deregulation of the domestic financial sector, and this also 
enabled the stock market sector to be viewed separately from the domestic financial sector 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003) . Overall, while the reform succeeded in easing financial 
repression, the impact on increasing growth, and investment has been patchy while the African 
financial system remains shallow and relatively underdeveloped (see Reinhart and Tokatlidis, 
2003). Instead the liberalisation appeared to engender greater instability and crises, particularly in 
the financial sector (Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).  
Financial instability, conversely, could manifest itself in banking failures, intense asset price 
volatility or a collapse in market liquidity and, ultimately, in a disruption in the payment and 
settlement system. Financial instability affects the real sector due to its links to the financial sector. 
It has the potential to cause significant macroeconomic costs, as it interferes with production, 
consumption, and investment, and, therefore, defeats the national goals of broader economic growth 
and development. Kaminsky and Reinhart’s results in confirmed this assertion insofar as they found 
that financial instability was positively associated with financial development.  Taken from this 
perspective it can be seen that safeguarding financial stability and identifying vulnerabilities within 
the financial system is essential to financial development. Some of these vulnerabilities have 
macroeconomic dimensions, such as changes in the conditions of household and corporation sector 
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balance sheets, and developments in credit and asset markets, all of which have the potential to 
affect the level and distribution of financial risk within the economy.  
Many leading African economists thought that the 2008 financial crisis could not affect the 
continent  because Africa’s bank and capital markets are not strongly integrated with the global 
market, or thet thought that the impact of the crisis on Africa would be minimal, but the effect of 
the crisis on the financial sector of the large economies in Africa has been quite adverse and 
substantial, (see Murinde, 2010). 
In this paper, we examined the effect of financial liberalisation, financial development and 
economic growth on financial instablity in Africa. In particular, we investigate whether financial 
instability has an impact on economic growth in African countries and whether the financial 
development and liberalisation that has been ongoing in Africa is associated with financial 
instability. In addition we examine whether the relationship between financial development and 
financial instability is more pronounced in the pre-liberalisation period or in the post-liberalisation 
period.  These questions are not trivial , considering the fact that instability is an inherent feature of 
the financial system, and that there is clear evidence in economic literature that financial 
liberalisation also raises economic costs, in terms of inflated financial fragility due to the inefficient 
and underdeveloped banking sector in developing countries. 
These issuse are even more relevant given that the subject of preverving financial stability has 
become a very important one on the international financial institution agenda. These issues are  also 
important for African countries, because their financial development is happening very quickly, and 
they need to integrate their economies into both the international financial structure, and 
international financial markets. We need to bear in mind the factor that can affect financial 
instability  and stability , and we need to take particular note of how these factors interact with some 
other to promote further growth.  
This paper adopts the dynamic panel method to illustrate the effect of the relationship between 
financial development, liberalisation and economic growth on  the financial instability of a sample 
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of 41 African countries from 1985 to 2010. Our results show that financial development and 
liberalisation have a statistically significant effect on financial instability but the latter has a harmful 
effect on economic growth, which is more pronounced in the pre-financial liberalisation periods 
than in the post-financial liberalisation periods. 
There are a few studies that directly link financial instability, financial development and Economic 
growth (Reinhart and Kamnsky (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiach (1988), Guillaumont and 
Kpodar (2004) and Loayza and Ranciere (2004). In this paper we restrict our focus to African 
countries only, which have been liberalising and developing their financial sectors in order to 
become efficient. With respect to the previous papers, we consider both financial development and 
financial liberalisation in the analyisi. We also  verifty the  effect in the pre and  post-financial 
liberalisation periods and  construct a continuous financial instability index by applying  a principal 
component analysis  on a number of financial instability indicators.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 is an outline of the theoretical background and  literature 
review, while in Section 3, we describe the methodology and data used. Section 4 presents the 
results and Section 5, summarises the main conclusions.   
 
2. The Theoretical background  and Literature Review  
The role of the financial system is essential to the economy and channels funds to those agents in 
the economy that have productive investment prospects (see Schumpeter (1911)1.  Earlier scholars 
such as Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) established the existence of a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth.  Recently, similar 
results were also achieved by  King and Livine (1992, 1993), Livine (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and Shahbaz (2009).  However, if the system does not perform at the optimum level, then 
the economy cannot operate efficiently and economic growth will be hindered. The main obstacle to 
                                                 
1
 According to Schumpeter, financial services are necessary for the development of entrepreneurship, the improvement 
of technology, productivity, and the acceleration of growth. 
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the efficient functioning of the financial system is the asymmetric information (see, Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1992), which leads to two simple problems in the financial system: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. There are ways to try to mitigate these problems. In the case of adverse selection, 
Akerlof (1970) proposes the lemons problem analysis which requires that governments must screen 
out good from bad credit risks. For moral hazard problem to be reduced, governments must impose 
restriction on borrowers so that borrowers do not engage in behaviour that makes it less likely that 
they can pay back loans. 
Over the two last decades, the institutional structure of the financial system has been evolving try to 
alleviate the problem of asymmetric information and try to avoid financial instability difficulties. 
Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so 
that the financial system can no longer do its jobs of mobilising saving, facilitating exchange of 
goods and services, reducing risk, and allocating resources to productive sectors. Deprived of these 
savings, the productive sector cuts it’s spending, causing a contraction of economic activity, which 
can sometimes be quite harsh. Without a doubt, fluctuations are associated with the volatility that is 
caused by a decision to invest, which not only affects aggregate demand and employment as Keynes 
(1936) suggests, but also affects the introduction of new products, processes and new management 
methods as Schumpeter (1911) suggested.  If the financial crisis is harsh enough, it can almost lead 
to a complete breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, which can provoke financial 
instability.  
A pioneer of this study was Hyman Minsky; who linked financial system fragility with speculative 
investment finance. His  theory was that “the internal dynamics of capitalist economies leads, over a 
period dominated by the full successful operation of a capitalist economy, to the emergence of 
financial structures which are conducive to debt deflation, the collapse of asset values and deep 
depressions” (Minsky, 1992b). According to Minsky (1980:215), instability underlies the 
appearance of stability in the financial markets. During periods of stability, when stock prices are 
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rising higher than the interest rate, investors are lured into taking more risks, which leads them to 
borrow more and to over pay for assets.  
Blejer (2006), points out three basic reasons for financial instability in the financial sector. Firstly, 
severe financial instability occurs when there is a dramatic growth in the volume of financial 
intermediation. Secondly, globalisation sees the whole world as a village, so integration of financial 
institutions seems to increase the systemic risk. The complexity of financial instruments is also a 
reason for financial instability and it is not easy to understand such financial instruments. 
Eichengreen, (2004) indicated four causes of financial instability and crisis which are: unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies2 ,the government and countries suffering of crises because they sustain 
inconsistent and unsustainable policies (see, Krugman, 1971). The next source indicated was the 
fragility of the financial system. Financial weakness 3 and the prevalence of currency mismatches in 
the financial system as pointed out by Goldstein and Turner, (2003) seemed to be the key font of 
financial fragility. Flaws in the structure of international financial markets were found by Keynes 
(1933), Nurkse (1944) and Brouwer (2001), who deduced from the great depression the destructive 
effects of destabilising international speculation. The final cause was found to be a weakness in 
institution framework, and also a weakness in domestic governance structures and corporate 
governances.  
Eichengreen et al (2001) carried out a study, estimating the output losses due to crises on a sample 
of 21 middle and high income countries over the last 120 years. The study also covered a large 
sample of emerging markets for a shorter period starting in 1973. They found that the loss from the 
average crises was almost 9 per cent of GDP. It was less than one per cent per year than the 
estimate presented by Dobson and Hufbauer (2001) for emerging markets and developing countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Caprio and Klingebel, (1996) estimate that the banking crises cost 2.4 per 
cent of output per year for each of their duration.  Goldstein et al. estimate that the currency crisis 
                                                 
2
 Mussa’s (2003) treatment of the recent Argentine case.  
3
 A classic example is the case of South Korea, the banks dependence on short term debt rendered them vulnerable to 
investor panics. 
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cost 3 per cent of output per year of their duration in low inflation countries and 6 per cent of output 
per year of their duration in high inflation countries. 
The general consensus is that policies that limit financial instability by restrictive financial 
transactions are likely to have costs as well as benefits (see, Bakaert and Harvey 2000; Levin, 
Henry, 2000). It’s also noted that financial liberalisation has a positive aspect which is that it 
facilitates financial development and has a significant effect on economic growth as evidenced by 
Ranciere et al. (2006) who decompose the effect of financial liberalisation into two parts: a direct 
effect on growth (which has a positive effect) and an indirect effect through the crises model ( 
which has a negative effect) with the positive effect on growth outweighing the negative effect of 
the crisis. On the other hand liberalised financial markets can be very volatile and extreme instances 
of volatility can result in a financial crisis which has a drastic impact on economic prosperity (see, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999).  In Martin and Rey (2005), stock market liberalisation and financial frictions in 
asset markets interact to generate either investment boom or financial crashes. In Dell’Arricia and 
Marquez (2004a, 2004b) financial liberalisation leads to less screening by banks, this gives rise to 
boom-bust credit cycles. 
As regards to the economic literature, there are a few studies (see, Guillaumont and Kpodar (2004), 
Loayza and Ranciere (2004) and Eggoh C. (2008), that took into consideration financial instability 
by analysing the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Eggoh’s 
empirical study revealed that financial instability has a negative impact on economic growth only as 
a short term phenomenon and financial development affects economic growth in the short and long 
term, while the negative impact of financial instability remains significant only in the short term. 
Bonifigliol and Mendocine, (2004) came to the conclusion that financial instability is detrimental 
for economic performance and the effect of a financial crisis is more dangerous in less developed 
and closed economies due to the poor quality of the institutions compared to the liberalised and 
open economies of advanced countries.Meanwhile Loayza and Ranciere (2004) found a positive 
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relationship in the long run between financial development and growth against a negative nexus in 
the short run but they point out that the variation of the financial development effect on economic 
growth between the long and short run is strongly bound to financial fragility, which they measured 
through the occurrence of  the systemic banking crisis. 
3. Methodology and Data 
Empirical specification 
In this section we discuss the empirical model used to estimate the relationship between financial 
instability, financial development and economic growth. In particular, we are interested in 
identifying the impact of financial instability on economic growth, taking into account financial 
development and liberalisation. To examine this relationship further, we estimate a dynamic panel 
model based on a balanced panel data between 1985 to 2010. In order to test this hypothesis, our 
econometric specification is expressed as follows: 
      = 	 + , + , + , + , + ∑  , +  + , 							(!. 1)                      
Where i and t denote country and time period, respectively. FInst  is the index of financial 
instability , Flib  is the   capital account openness index, .Gr  represents growth of GDP per 
capita, while Fdev   is the aggregate index of financial development. As explained above, we use a 
composite index of financial development, using, M2, private sector credit, and liquid liabilities, all 
as ratios to GDP.  The key reason for building composite indexes was to avoid the problem of 
multi-collinearity4 that occurs when simultaneously introducing several financial variables that are 
highly correlated among them. The principal component and factor analysis which are methods for 
data reduction are ways that can be considered when dealing with multi-collinearity, even though 
there is the econometric theory which suggests that many other procedures could solve the problem. 
For this study, we preferred using the principal components method because it provides many 
advantages. Apart from helping to reduce multi-collinearity, improving parsimony and improving 
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the measurement of indirectly observed concepts, it makes economic sense by aiding the re-
conceptualisation of the meaning of the predictor in our regression model. 
X is a vector of control variables that include: inflation rate, change in terms of trade, output gap, 
and government expenditure.  The terms iµ  and ti ,ε respectively denote a country effect capturing 
unobserved country characteristics and an error term. Equation (1) poses a dynamics error 
component model. Substantial complications are arising in the estimation of this model using OLS. 
In both the fixed and random settings, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error 
term, even if the disturbances are not autocorrelated. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a 
generalised method of moment (GMM) estimator that solves the problems using the first difference 
of the equation  
∆ = 	 + ∆, + ∆, + ∆, + , +&

∆, +  + , 							(!. 2) 
The problems of possible endogeneity bias due to interaction between the financial instability and 
financial liberalisation and development, autocorrelation, individual specific heteroscedasticity, and 
omitted variable bias are overcome by employing the system GMM-estimator (Generalised method 
of moment) developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which relies on using instrumental variables. 
The system GMM estimator combines equations in first difference with equation in levels, using 
lagged internal instruments in difference equations. Estimates in the next sub section are based on a 
one step system estimator, with robust standard errors.  The consistency of the GMM estimators 
depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the financial 
instability regression. We address this issue by considering two specification tests suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample 
analogy of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error 
term εi,t is not serially correlated. As in the case of the Sargan test, the model specification is 
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supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the system specification we test whether the 
differenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences) is second-order serially 
correlated. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original 
error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk. Second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and 
follows a moving average process at least of order one. This would reject the appropriateness of the 
proposed instruments (and would call for higher-order lags to be used as instruments). 
 
The Data Description 
Our sample consists of the annual observation of 41 African countries selected on the basis of data 
availability during the period 1985-2010. The source of the data is primarily from the Africa 
Development indicator (World Bank,2010),  and Chinn and Ito (2002).We would describe the 
various indexes used in the empirical analysis as the financial instability and financial development 
indexes, both built using the factoring analysis. 
Index of financial instability 
Recent studies, Gracia Herrero et al. (2003) and  Cihak (2007) have used as a dummy the banking 
crises as a proxy of  financial instability but there are problems in using this as an  indicator because 
it is to accurately difficult identify the exact timing of a crises as indicated by Caprio and 
Klingebiel, (1996). Crises are taken into consideration only when they are severe enough to trigger 
market events but when they are successfully contained by prompt and corrective policies they are 
neglected, by only taking the banking crises into account,   instability in other parts of the financial 
system is neglected.  
To overcome these problems, authors  such as Guillaumout and Kpodar (2004) and Loayza and 
Ranciere, (2004)  constucted  an indicator of financial instability by measuring of financial 
development, which is the standard deviation residual for each seven year period issued from the 
estimate of the financial development indicator trend over the period of study, which means that the 
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index  of financial instability is calculated from the standard deviation of the residual of the 
financial development variable regressed on its delayed valued and a trend. Loayza and Ranciere, 
(2004 ) calculated as the standard deviation from financial development growth, whereas  Eggoh 
Jude, (2008), measured financial instability through a cyclical component of the financial 
development index.   
In this paper we follow the method proposed by Jeroen Klomp and Jakob de Haan, (2009) to 
construct a continous financial instability indicatore by applying factoring analysis on a number of 
financial stability indicators. The principal reason of building a composite index was to avoid the 
problem of multi-collinearity5 that occurs when introducing simultaneously several financial 
instability variables that are highly correlated among them.  The principal component analysis 
method involves a mathematical procedure that transforms a number of correlated variables into a 
small number of uncorrelated variables called principal components.  The first principal component 
accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible and each succeeding component 
accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible.  That is, the method generates those 
linear combinations of object measure (called eigenvectors), which express the great statistical 
variances over the entire object under consideration.  This is particularly useful when they are 
hiding between different object measures. 
Our data consists of commonly used financial instability indicators that are composites of variables 
taken from the banking system’s balance sheet such as domestic credit provided by bank, credit 
provided to private sector, and liabilities liquidity (see Beck et al. 2006).  Risk and return indicators 
such as real interest rate and interest rate spread are included to show if financial risk rises or 
decreases, thus possibly distressing the stability of the financial sector.  Monetary authority 
indicators take into account variables such as money and quasi money (M2) as percent of GDP 
because huge changes in the supply of money may indicate the existence of problems (see Table 1).   
                                                 
5
 Multi-collinearity refers to a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated   
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The first principal component of the three variables accounts for 83% of their overall variance  and, 
as expected, is highly correlated with each individual measure included. Specifically, the correlation 
between the first principal component and a change in the domestic credit provided by the banks is 
0.90, the correlation between the change in credit to the private sector is 0.83, and the change in 
liquid liabilities is 0.77, and its correlation M2 is 0.67 (See Table 1).  Figure 1 shows the scree plot 
of the eigenvalues that indicate the numbers of components that have to represent financial 
instability and according to the so-called Kaiser criterion, the component with the eigenvalues 
above one should be selected.  In our case, the test suggested the selection of three components.  In 
addition the first principal component was then used to derive weight (scores) for the financial 
instability index.  
Index of financial instability = (Change in domestic credit by banks*0.52) + (Change in credit to 
private      sector*0.50) + (Change in Liquid Liabilities* 0.49) + (Change in money and quasi 
money (M2) as % GDP*0.46) + (0.17* Change in real interest rate) + (Change in interest rate 
spread*0.10). 
Where the financial instability index is the value of the aggregate financial instability measure and 
the score coefficient has been regarded as weights, the source of the various variables is World 
Development indicators (2010).  For ease of analysis, in Table 2, we classified the countries in the 
sample into three categories depending on whether they have a high, a moderate, or a low financial 
instability index.  More specifically, the classification depends on the range of periods from 1985-
1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2010.  The first point to be made from this table is that for most 
countries in the sample, the instability pattern has changed significantly over time. For example, 
over the period 1985-1990, Nigeria had a low financial instability index, and from 1991-2000 it 
moved to a moderate instability. However, over the period 2001-2010 it had a low financial 
instability index.  The second point to be made is that most countries in Africa are classified as 
highly or moderately unstable, meaning that the financial sector in these countries is very volatile.   
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Index of financial liberalisation  
 For the financial liberalisation index, we employed the index for capital account openness that was 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2007) and updated in 2010. They used the data reported in the Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions published by the IMF (2010) on the 
existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current and capital accounts (where the latter is 
measured as the proportion of last five years without control) and the requirements to surrender 
export proceeds in order to capture the intensity of control on capital account transactions. Their 
index of openness is the first standardised principal component of these variables, and in practice it 
ranges from -2.0 in the case of the most control to 2.5 in the case of the most liberalisation. This 
data is available for 108 countries from 1970 to 2010.   
Index of financial development  
The aggregate financial development index was constructed using the principal component analysis 
from the main financial development indicators, which in Africa is the banking system: namely, 
liquid liabilities as a per cent of GDP, M2 as a per cent of GDP and domestic private credit to the 
banking sector as a per cent of GDP (See Enowbi and Mlambo, 2010).  We expect these financial 
development variables to be positive and significantly correlated with the index of financial 
development while they are all positively correlated with the index of financial instability.  
Following the suggestions of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), macroeconomic control 
variables are included such as inflation, a change in the term of trade and government expenditure. 
These could account for adverse and external shocks that affect the economy and which can 
increase the instability of the financial system, for example, by affecting the solvency of borrowers, 
by increasing uncertainty, or by unexpected and excessive exposure to foreign risk (Goldstein et 
al.2000). We also include GDP per capita and the growth of GDP per capital to control whether the 
detrimental effect of financial instability is channelled through the instability of economic 
prosperity.  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables below. 
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3. Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the effect of financial instability on economic growth, 
financial developement and liberalisation. Column 1 provides an estimate of the  impact of financial 
instability on economic growth , taking into account the effect of financial liberalisation. Findings 
suggest that financial instability has a postive affect on  financial liberalisation meaning that 
liberalisation process tends to increase financial instablility. whereas it has an inverse effect on 
economic growth , confirming  the results of Demrguc-Kunt and Detragiach (1998) .  
Column 2 takes into account financial development and the results show that its association with 
financial instability is positive and significant  while the effect on economic growth is negative and 
significant. It is interesting to see that the marginal effect of financial development on financial 
instability is more pronounced (a positive sign) than that of financial liberalisation .   
When the two variables (financial development and liberalisation) are both included in the 
estimation , ( see column 3) , the results concerning the effects of economic growth on financial 
liberalsiation  and development on financial instability does not change dramatically. Financial 
development and liberalsiation has a favourable impact on financial instability with the effects of 
financial liberalisation  greater than the effect of  fianncial development while economic growth has  
an opposite effect. These results suggest how instability is intrinsically linked to the financial sector. 
It is noted that the positive link between financial instability and financial liberalisation and 
development tends to affect the nexus between finance and growth by damaging economic growth . 
The development and efficiency of  the financial sector is riddled with continous financial 
instability  which leads to lack  of confidence in investors.  
With regard to the other explanatory variables, the output gap has the right sign, and is positive and 
significant in all the columns. The real income per capita, government size and inflation has  mixed 
results and the terms of trade shock has the opposite sign but is not statistically  significant . 
In Table 5 we split the sample into two, and we considered the years in which the countries were 
financially  liberalised and the years in which they were not.  In the year of liberalisations, the 
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impact of economic growth and financial development on financial instability is less than is the case 
in the year in which the financial sector was not liberalise. This suggests that financial liberalisation 
reduces the negative effect  of financial instability on economic growth and has a  positive to with 
financial development.  
For each regression, we tested the specification of the equation with the Sagan test for instrument 
validity, and then we tested it with the serial correlation test for second order serial correlation. The 
test results suggest that our instruments are valid, and there exists no evidence of second serial 
correlation in our estimation.  
4. Conclusion and Policy Implication  
This paper investigates the effect of financial instablility on economic growth, financial 
development and liberalisation in African countries during the period  1985 to 2010, using the 
dynamic panel method. We document our findings as follows: firstly, we found that financial 
instability has an adverse effect on economic growth in African countries. Secondly,  we found that 
financial development and financial liberalisation typically leads to financial instability, and  
thirdly,  we found that the effect of financial instability on financial development and economic 
growth is less evident  in the  post financial liberalisation period.  
This study demontrate how financial liberalisation and development are fundamental to financial 
stability.  Therefore, there is a danger that in trying to aviod financial instability, the intervention by 
African countries policymakers can create rigidity or  financial repression policies rather than  
realising a more stable financial system which could be achieved by:  
Financial rules and regulations  being designed to widen the space for the growth and stability of 
oriented marcoeconomic policies. At the same time it should be kept in mind that regulations can 
also be problematic not only because they can themselves be the source of instability and can have 
adverse effects on financial intermediation and development. These aspects of regulation should be 
taken into account when designing prudential and capital account regimes. It should take into 
account the particularlity  of each country, no one-size-fits all solution should be adopted. 
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Institutions may need to be strengthened  or created before new policies  and regulatory measures 
are introduced . 
In order to improve the situation there should be coordination among the various public authorities  
responsible for monetary policy, regulation and supervision of the financial system. Some of these  
responsibilities may come under the same authority, this is particularly true for  the monetary 
policy. Financial  regulation and supervision should come under the authority of the Central Bank, 
given their task of attaining stability in the financial system.  
In addition, the African governments efforts should be directed in creating an economic 
environment which establishs a stable marcoeconomic environment with sound monetary polices 
and fiscal discipline and a peaceful political environment. They should also provide adequate 
institutions that respect property rights, and  law and order  and  generate adequate human capital 
which can create a relationship between marco stability and growth that reduces uncertainty, 
strengthens credibility and improves the overall macroeconomic environment, thus boosting direct 
foreign investment , domestic investment , and accelerating the process of  economic growth and 
thereby  reducing poverty . 
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Table1: Principal Component Analysis of Financial Instability Indicator  
 
 
 
Variables  Comp loading  (1) Variance explained (2) Correlations (3)  
    
Change in domestic credit by banks  0.52 0.43 0.90 
Change in credit to the private sector  0.50 0..27 0.83 
Change in Liquid Liabilities   0.49 0.13 0.77 
Change money and quasi money (M2) as % GDP 0.46 0.06 0.67 
Change real interest rate  0.17 0.05 0.27 
Change in  interest rate spread 0.15 0.04 0.30 
Column (1) shows the component loading weight individual, column (2) shows the variance explained by the component model of the 
individual indicators, column (3) shows the correlation between the individual indicator and the component model.   
 
Figure 1: Scree Plot 
 
Note: The graph shows the variance explained by the various factors 
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Index Fin. Instability  667 -2.58 0.99 -7.03 11.72 
Index Fin. Development  1010 5.25 1.11 1.56 8.23 
Growth  of GDP per Capita 1150 0.008 0.06 -0.69 0.65 
Log. GDP per Capita. 1197 6.21 1.07 4.05 9.06 
Change in Terms of trade 1150 -0.55 9.99 -107.3 42.9 
Inflation rate 1078 4.7 0.35 4.4 10.1 
Government Size 1131 2.6 0.4 0.7 3.8 
Output Gap 1197 -0.67 9.2 -139.5 33.8 
Capital Account Openness 1110 -0.67 1.08 -1.8 2.4 
Domestic credit to the private sector.  1167 19.9 21.4 0 161.9 
Liquid Liabilities  1057 3.3 0.65 -0.18 6.6 
Credit to the Private Sector 1131 2.6 0.89 -0.38 5.08 
Money and quasi Money 1150 3.2 0.63 -0.77 4.7 
Real interest rate  873 9.22 31.98 -96.8 605.43 
Interest rate spread 860 20.3 43.6 0.53 261.23 
Change in domestic credit given by banks  1116 -0.07 15.25 -123.9 319.53 
Change  in credit to the private sector  1117 0.25 6.9 -80.9 102.5 
Change in Liquid Liabilities   1009 0.241 19.15 -300.50 248.19 
Change in money and quasi money (M2) as % GDP 1113 0.58 4.8 -68.95 64.9 
Change in real interest rate  824 1.09 18.15 -126.7 298.6 
Change in  interest rate spread 778 0.66 11.9 -104.3 164.3 
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Table 3: Financial instability 
 
*A country is classified as high instability if it has  an index great than 0. It is classified as moderate instability if it has an index less 
than 0. Countries with the index less than or equal to -0.25 are classified as low instability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country  
Classification 
1985-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
High instability   Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda,  South Africa, Kenya, 
Morocco, Burkina Faso , Burundi, 
Comoros, Mauritius, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Liberia, and Cape Verde    
Uganda , Ethiopia , Zambia, Cape 
Verde , Namibia, South Africa, 
Mozambique, Gambia  
Mauritius, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,  
Rwanda , Guinean, Egypt, Comoros, 
Malawi, Senegal, and Zimbabwe      
  
Mozambique, Tanzania, South 
Africa, Botswana,   Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Guinea, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Egypt, Comoros, 
Ethiopia, Central Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia ,Tanzania, Gambia, Liberia, 
and Cape Verde     
  
Moderate  
instability 
Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, Mali, 
Niger, Gabon, Kenya, Cote d’ivoire, 
Congo, Rep. Burundi. Egypt, Benin, 
Morocco, Botswana, Togo, Chad, 
Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, 
Lesotho, Seychelles, Central Africa,  
Rwanda, Central African Republic, 
Kenya , Togo, Benin, Chad, Niger, 
Algeria, Malawi,    Lesotho,  Burkina 
Faso, Mali,  Botswana, Tunisia, 
Gabon , Nigeria , Tanzania, Kenya, 
Malawi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Central 
Africa Republic, Mauritius, Lesotho, 
Gabon, Cameroon,  Nigeria, Algeria, 
Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Congo 
Rep. , Djibouti , Gabon, Chad, 
Madagascar,  Rwanda, and Malawi.  
Low instability Tunisia, Gambia, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Togo, Congo Rep, 
Algeria, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and  
Mauritania 
Libya, Seychelles, Zambia, Chad, 
Nigeria, Congo Rep.   
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Notes: the dependent variable is the index of financial instability.  The robust standard deviations are given in parentheses. ,**,*** indicate statistically  significant at the 10%, 5%  and 1% level 
respectively. The statistics are p-value for serial correlation test. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit non second order serial correlation. The reported 
statistics are p-value of Sagan/Hansen test.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table:4:   
The effect of financial instability on financial liberalisation, financial development and on the economic growth of African countries, (1985-
2010) .Estimation: Dynamic panel regression, system GMM estimation: 
Dependent variable: Index of financial instability. 
Annual Estimations   (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
Lag. Fin. Instability -0.12 (0.43) *** -0.27 (0.065)*** -0.11 (0.07) 
Growth Real GDP Per Cap.  -2.32 (0.59)*** -2.7 (1.2) * -2.64 (069)** 
Log. Real GDP Per Cap. 0.02 (0.04) 0.58 (0.33)* -0.077 (0.05) 
Inflation rate  0.20 (0.29) -1.01 (0.78) -0.15 (0.09)* 
Change in terms of trade -0.04 (0.002) -0.001 (.003) -0.004 (0.002) 
Output gap 0.02(0.014) ** 0.052 (0.22)** 0.03(0.016)** 
Log. Government size -0,05 (0.16) 1.1 (0,81) -0.20 (0.22) 
Financial liberalisation 0.39 (0.15)**  0.32 (0.13)** 
Financial development  1.8 (0.73)** 0.25 (0.10)** 
Constant -1.07  (1.1) 2.8 (3.8)  
Serial correlation 0.242 0.233 0.184 
Sagan  Test 0.971 0.973 0.967 
Number of instruments 46 54 57 
Number of observations 480 489 480 
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Table 5: The  Effect of Financial instability on financial development and on the Economics Growth in African countries from 1985-
2010, considering the financial liberalisation period and the non-financial liberalisation period.  
Annual Estimation Fin. Liberalisation years Non-fin. Lib. years 
   
Lag. Fin. Instability 0.09 (0.18) 0.24 (0.49) 
Growth Real GDP Per Capita. -2.6 (0.64)*** -3.7 (1.7)** 
Log. Real GDP Per Capita. -0.02 (0.04) 0.16 (0.22) 
Inflation Rate -0.04 (0.36)* 0.28 (0.48) 
Change in terms of trade -0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.015) 
Output gap 0.032 (0.007)** 0.01 (0.023) 
Log. Government Size 0.032 (0.10) -0.08 (0.08) 
Financial Development 0.096 (0.045)** 0.26 (0.14)* 
Constant 2.7 (1.7) -1.7 (2.4) 
Serial Correlation 0.5771 0.325 
Sargan test 0.1986 0.620 
Number of instruments 27 11 
Number of Observation 242 133 
Notes: the dependent variable is the index of financial instability.  The robust standard deviations are given in parentheses. ,**,*** indicate statistically  significant at the 10%, 5%  and 1% level 
respectively. The statistics are p-value for serial correlation test. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit non second order serial correlation. The reported 
statistics are p-value of Sagan/Hansen test.  
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Country        Fin. Instability index 
 
Growth GDP per Capita 
 
Fin. Dev. index Fin. liberalisation.  
BDI 0.054 
 
-1.0% 
 
5.011 -1.287 
BEN -0.167 
 
0.6% 
 
5.311 -0.686 
BFA 0.004 
 
2.1% 
 
4.898 -0.766 
BWA 0.044 
 
3.9% 
 
5.144 0.591 
CAF -0.013 
 
-1.0% 
 
4.224 -0.938 
CIV -0.024 
 
-0.9% 
 
5.471 -0.938 
CMR -0.084 
 
-1.1% 
 
4.654 -0.938 
COG -0.110 
 
-0.3% 
 
4.400 -1.106 
COM 0.037 
 
-1.0% 
 
4.879 -1.148 
CPV 0.266 
 
3.6% 
 
6.484 -1.148 
DJI -0.108 
 
-1.4% 
 
6.850 
 DZA -0.071 
 
0.4% 
 
6.090 -1.232 
EGY -0.010 
 
2.6% 
 
7.144 0.370 
ETH 0.103 
 
2.5% 
 
5.468 -1.204 
GAB -0.070 
 
-0.8% 
 
4.649 -0.686 
GHA -0.051 
 
2.3% 
 
4.532 -1.342 
GIN 0.002 
 
0.7% 
 
3.519 -1.315 
GMB -0.010 
 
0.4% 
 
5.271 1.506 
GNB -0.202 
 
-0.2% 
 
4.627 -1.206 
KEN -0.025 
 
0.5% 
 
6.049 0.026 
LBR 0.409 
 
-5.2% 
 
4.475 1.189 
LBY -1.111 
 
2.1% 
 
6.272 -1.204 
LSO -0.130 
 
2.0% 
 
5.670 -0.992 
MAR 0.077 
 
2.2% 
 
6.873 -1.050 
MDG -0.057 
 
-0.7% 
 
4.885 -0.602 
MLI -0.077 
 
1.9% 
 
5.232 -0.686 
MOZ 0.087 
 
4.0% 
 
5.100 -1.306 
MRT -0.224 
 
0.4% 
 
5.634 -1.162 
MUS 0.293 
 
4.1% 
 
7.098 0.692 
MWI 0.016 
 
0.8% 
 
4.527 -1.217 
NAM 0.186 
 
1.2% 
 
6.290 -1.192 
NER -0.046 
 
-0.4% 
 
4.220 -0.633 
NGA -0.156 
 
2.2% 
 
4.880 -1.151 
RWA 0.005 
 
1.1% 
 
4.382 -0.963 
SDN 
  
3.1% 
 
4.044 -1.010 
SEN -0.067 
 
0.5% 
 
5.449 -0.686 
SLE -0.090 
 
-0.1% 
 
3.814 -0.999 
SYC 0.293 
 
2.6% 
 
6.367 1.456 
TCD -0.079 
 
1.3% 
 
3.836 -1.022 
TGO -0.091 
 
-0.2% 
 
5.622 -1.148 
TUN -1.640 
 
2.7% 
 
6.917 -0.980 
TZA -0.009 
 
2.0% 
 
4.576 -1.110 
UGA -0.027 
 
3.1% 
 
4.045 0.651 
ZAF 0.239 
 
0.6% 
 
7.180 
 ZAR 
  
-3.5% 
 
2.568 -1.106 
ZMB 0.007 
 
0.2% 
 
4.599 0.581 
ZWE 0.243 
 
-1.8% 
 
6.252 -1.566 
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Figure 2: Financial Instability Index and GDP per Capita Growth 
 
Figure 3: Financial Instability Index and Financial Liberalisation 
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Figure 4: Financial Instability Index and Financial Development Index  
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Table 6: Pairwise Correlation Fin.Instabiliy Growth GDP per Capita Fin.Dev. Shock of Trade Inflation  Gov. Size GDP per capita Fin.Lib. output gap 
Financial instability 1.000 
        
Growth GDP per Capita -0.105*** 1.000 
       
Financial development    0.17*** 0.04 1.000 
      
Shock  of Term of Trade -0.013 0.05*     0.016 1.000 
     
Inflation -0.005 -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22  1.000 
    
Gov. Size 0.024 0.007  0.046*** 0.047 -0.21*** 1.000 
   
 GDP per Capita 0.03 0.12*** 0.58*** 0.024 0.16*** 0.39***       1.000 
  
Financial Liberalisation 0.078* 0.05 0.12*** -0.0128    0.11*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 1.000 
 
Output Gap -0.019 0.1       -0.039 0.043    0.013 -0.01       0.02 -0.037 1.000 
  
Table 6: Pairwise Correlation 
 
